I disagree with the definition of the word ‘metalanguage’ given here: Wikipedia definition - as a language for description of languages. I want to use this or other term for talking about the meaning of what is being expressed by a language. In other words I want to discuss “why?” or better to say “what for?” all these humans and machines use those particular words, phrases and sentences? What are their intentions and how these intentions can be represented in a meaningful way? How are these intentions translated into words? These are the questions similar to the Aristotle’s understanding of ‘metaphysics’ as something beyond the description of observable physical phenomena, the meaning of physics, described in the books of the treatise past/following the book named ‘Physics’.
    Because of all this I decided to use the hyphened form of the word ‘meta-language’ in my work that will be devoted to what I’ve just said - the combinations of mental meanings and intentions of the parties, communicating with the help of language. And it will be in the virtual organization meta-language
    My understanding is probably in some sense much closer to what is described in this wikipedia article as Compiler-compiler. And I agree with its constructive approach: defining a meta-language should result in creating a ‘compiler’ that can, in its turn, compile a ‘parser’/’interpreter’ and ‘decompile’ this ‘compiler’ back from the instance of the parser.
   Another example is Goedel. He was talking about a simple thing: logic is fully devoted to 1.5 ‘meta’ ideas that are being expressed by all of it, namely: the idea of truth (or falsehood) and the half-idea of sequence of combinations some of which (tautologies) are true and some are not. Of course this description of what is true and what is false in ‘beyond’ the language of arithmetic itself, dealing with numbers, counting and four operations of arithmetic! It’s obvious. In this way ‘True’ and ‘False’ are the words of meta-language describing the statements and sequences of statements of the language (of arithmetics). And probably this is where the present understanding of the term comes from, because you can arguably call this particular act of assigning a (True/False) meaning to the objects expressing it in the Goedel’s metalanguage scheme a ‘description’ of sorts. In other words: logic is a meta-language (in my sense of the word) of the language of arithmetics.
   What I was trying to express in these brief several paragraphs is: as in many other cases of contemporary scholastic pseudo-science the carriage is in front of the hourse, instead of understanding and rationally systematising the combinatorics of meaning and its transformation into texts and speech by doing the routine experimental work of observation let’s indefinitely examine ‘theoretically’ the combinatorics of the words symbolizing (allegedly ‘unknown’) meanings. The little boy’s question is of course:”Why are you saying that the meanings are “unknown”? We are speaking to each other and understanding each other. I understand what you’ve just said.” And this manipulation of symbolic representations of real objects as if they are the objects of investigation is the quintessential scholastics!
Later.